Global production of sustainable aviation fuel is still growing, but not fast enough to change the economics of airline decarbonization. At IATA’s 82nd Annual General Meeting and World Air Transport Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the trade body said SAF output is expected to reach about 2.4 million tonnes in 2026, equal to roughly 0.8% of aviation fuel use.
IATA framed that as another disappointing year for supply, and the numbers help explain why. At that level, SAF would still cover only a tiny slice of the fuel burned by airlines worldwide, leaving the industry dependent on conventional jet fuel for almost all of its energy needs. IATA also said the estimated cost to airlines would be about $4.3 billion.
That combination of low supply and high cost is now the central obstacle in the airline industry’s emissions strategy. Airlines can sign purchase agreements and announce climate targets, but those steps do not create refineries, feedstock supply, or the policy support needed to scale production quickly.
What IATA Said in Rio
IATA held its 82nd AGM and World Air Transport Summit in Rio de Janeiro from June 6 to June 8, 2026. In press materials released during the meeting, the association said global SAF production is expected to reach around 2.4 million tonnes in 2026.
That forecast matters because it gives a concrete measure of how much of aviation’s fuel demand can be met with a lower-carbon alternative. Based on IATA’s own figures, 2.4 million tonnes would represent about 0.8% of aviation fuel use. In other words, even if the forecast is achieved, SAF would still account for less than 1% of the fuel burned by the industry.
The same estimate implies a gap of roughly 299.6 million tonnes between expected SAF output and total aviation fuel use, assuming the 2.4 million-tonne figure equals 0.8% of demand. That is a useful reminder that the issue is not just whether SAF exists, but whether it can be produced at industrial scale.
IATA also said the estimated cost to airlines would be about $4.3 billion. Because SAF remains more expensive than conventional jet fuel, higher production has not yet translated into a lower-cost transition for carriers. Instead, airlines are being asked to pay more for a limited supply of fuel that still reaches only a small part of their operations.
Why the SAF Gap Still Matters
The aviation industry has made SAF one of its main decarbonization tools because most aircraft in service today cannot simply switch to batteries or hydrogen. That makes SAF a critical bridge solution, particularly for long-haul flying, where alternatives remain limited.
But bridge solutions only work if the bridge is long enough and strong enough to carry traffic. A supply share of 0.8% leaves airlines with very little room to substitute away from fossil jet fuel in the near term, even as pressure mounts from customers, regulators, investors, and corporate travel buyers to cut emissions.
For airlines, the financial effect is immediate. Fuel is one of the industry’s biggest operating costs, and any premium attached to SAF can be hard to absorb, especially when carriers are already dealing with cyclical demand, fleet renewal costs, and pressure on margins. The $4.3 billion estimate highlighted by IATA shows why executives continue to describe SAF as essential but still expensive.
For policymakers, the problem is different but closely linked. The market is not yet delivering enough supply on its own, which is why the debate increasingly centers on whether governments should use mandates, tax incentives, loan support, or other investment tools to accelerate production. IATA’s warning suggests that voluntary demand alone has not been enough to move the market at the pace airlines need.
What Is Holding SAF Back
The basic challenge is that SAF production requires a wider industrial ecosystem than traditional jet fuel. Producers need reliable feedstocks, processing capacity, transport infrastructure, and long-term demand visibility before committing large amounts of capital.
That makes SAF expansion slower than a simple demand signal would suggest. Airlines have entered purchase agreements, but those agreements do not automatically unlock new plants or faster feedstock development. The lag between announcement and delivery remains one of the biggest structural problems in the market.
Price is another barrier. SAF is still produced in limited volumes, which keeps costs elevated compared with fossil jet fuel. Until output grows enough to reduce unit costs, airlines will keep paying a premium for every tonne they buy, and that premium can affect route economics, ticket pricing, and corporate contracting.
There is also a timing problem. The industry is being asked to reduce emissions steadily over the next several years, but SAF supply is increasing from a very small base. That means a growing share of the industry’s climate strategy depends on technologies and policy frameworks that are still developing.
Brazil’s Opportunity as a SAF Hub
IATA’s Rio meeting also put Brazil in focus. In a June 8 press release, the association highlighted the country’s potential to become a SAF powerhouse, signaling that the airline industry sees Brazil as more than just another market for fuel demand.
That view is tied to Brazil’s industrial and agricultural strengths. The country has extensive feedstock availability, a large energy sector, and the capacity to build a broader biofuels supply chain. Those ingredients matter because SAF will not scale without a dependable source of inputs and the infrastructure to process them.
Brazil’s appeal also goes beyond domestic use. If production capacity grows, the country could eventually become an exporter of SAF or SAF feedstocks, giving it a role in the international aviation fuel market. That would matter for airlines looking for diversified supply and for policymakers seeking to anchor new clean-fuel investment at home.
Still, potential is not the same as output. IATA’s comments in Rio point to a familiar pattern in clean energy markets: resource-rich countries can become hubs only if policy, capital, and industrial planning move together. The airline industry’s interest alone will not build the facilities required.
What Happens Next
The immediate next step is not a new global aviation fuel target, but a test of whether the market can convert attention into new projects. Independent aviation coverage reported the same core figures in Rio and echoed the concern that SAF availability remains far below what is needed for net-zero aviation goals.
For airlines, the practical question is how much higher SAF supply can rise before the cost burden becomes harder to manage. For governments, the question is whether to create clearer incentives that would lower investor risk and bring more production online. For Brazil, the issue is whether interest from the aviation sector can be turned into real industrial capacity.
The numbers from IATA do not suggest a collapse in SAF growth. They suggest something more difficult to solve: the market is moving, but far too slowly to match aviation’s climate ambitions. Until production scales well beyond a small fraction of fuel demand, airlines will keep facing a transition that is technically important, financially costly, and still short of what the industry says it needs.
